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Suspicious Minds: Coliva on Moore’s Paradox and Commitment 
 
(This is my contribution to a symposium on Annalisa Coliva’s The Varieties of Self-Knowledge 
in Philosophia, forthcoming soon) 
 
1. Introduction: Varieties of Self-Knowledge and Varieties of Belief 
 
In The Varieties of Self-Knowledge, Annalisa Coliva defends a pluralist approach, according 
to which we know about our different kinds of mental states in different ways. The case for 
pluralism in some area of philosophy is often rather defeatist in spirit. We try out a number 
of different explanations for some phenomena, and realise that each falls short; at best 
each explanation looks good for some initial, restricted diet of examples, but once we 
consider the full range of the phenomena to be explained, things go awry (e.g. Wright 2013: 
123). This kind of reasoning to a pluralist conclusion might plausibly apply to the debate on 
self-knowledge, where there’s been a tendency to construct accounts that perhaps work 
well enough for either beliefs, or phenomenal states such as pains, but struggle badly when 
applied more broadly. Coliva’s book isn’t free of this kind of reasoning (and there’s no 
reason it should be!), but there’s also a more positive, bottom-up case for pluralism: an 
argument that takes seriously the variety between the states supposedly self-known, and 
posits an appropriate variety of ways that states can be self-known.  
 
Interestingly, Coliva’s positive case for pluralism can be made without considering any other 
mental states beyond belief, since she argues we need a distinction between beliefs as 
dispositions and beliefs as commitments, and this already forces any comprehensive account 
of self-knowledge to be heterogeneous. Beliefs as dispositions, as characterised by Coliva, 
are ‘not the result of conscious deliberation’ or the assessment of evidence, not under one’s 
direct control, and not states that one can be held ‘rationally responsible’ for (2016: 28), 
while beliefs as commitments ‘depend on a judgement based on the assessment of the 
evidence at subjects’ disposal and that, for this reason, are within their control and for 
which they are held rationally responsible’ (2016: 32). While beliefs as commitments can be 
self-known in a distinctively first-personal way, we can at best have ‘third-person’ self-
knowledge of our beliefs as dispositions; we can know about them though self-directed 
mindreading, involving interpretation of our own behaviour (verbal and non-verbal) plus 
‘other mental states one has knowledge of in a first-personal way, such as one’s sensations, 
immediate feelings and propositional attitudes as commitments’ (2016: 70). 
 
Why think we have two species of belief here (rather than, for example, belief proper and 
something like Tamar Gendler’s notion of an alief: see Gendler 2008)? To the extent that we 
use the same word for both, why don’t the differences gestured at in the previous 
paragraph suggest the situation with ‘belief’ is much like the situation with ‘jade’? Coliva 
responses that there is ‘considerable overlap…to justify the idea that they are more like two 
species of the same genus, and therefore it is no mere accident that the term “belief” is, in 
fact, applied to both’ (2016: 37). Coliva doesn’t say much about what this overlap consists 
in, but she does suggest that when one has a belief as commitment that P, one has ‘at least 
some of the same behavioural dispositions’ one would have if one had a belief as disposition 
with the same content’. 
 
2. Moore’s Paradox 
 
There’s a lot more that could be said about this distinction within the class of beliefs, and 
the role that it plays in Coliva’s pluralist theory of self-knowledge, but my attention here will 
be on its role in her discussion of Moore’s paradox in the appendix to the book. As it is 
usually thought of, Moore’s paradox is that assertions of the form ‘P, but I don’t believe that 
P’ sound contradictory even though there’s no contradiction between the two conjuncts of 
what I assert. In contrast to any explicit contradiction, the past tense (‘P, but I didn’t believe 
that P’) and third person analogues of Moorean conjunctions (‘P, but she didn’t believe that 
P’) seem totally unremarkable; likewise, there’s no problem with supposing rather than 
asserting the original conjunction. 
 
The boundaries of the paradox are disputed, but it’s relatively uncontroversial that it 
extends along a number of dimensions. First, as Coliva notes, John Williams (1979) has 
pointed out that Moore offers examples showing that claims of the form ‘I believe that P, 
but not-P’ seem equally bad; Williams calls the original the omissive version, and this variant 
the commissive version. Second, Moore also suggested that assertions of the form ‘P, but I 
don’t know that P’ are also paradoxical; elsewhere (McGlynn 2013), I’ve called these 
epistemic Moorean assertions, to distinguish them from the original doxastic examples.1 
Third, at least since Roy Sorensen’s Blindspots (1988), it’s been widely recognised that 
beliefs of the form ‘P, but I don’t believe P and ‘I believe that P, but not-P’ seem just as 
paradoxical as the corresponding assertions; despite the content of such beliefs being 
consistent, believing a doxastic Moorean conjunction seems to be deeply irrational or 
absurd. 
 
There are a number of different accounts of Moore’s paradox, offering competing 
explanations of how believing or asserting a perfectly consistent content can give rise to 
contradictoriness, absurdity, or irrationality. Moreover, as Coliva notes (Coliva 2016: 243-4), 
many of these accounts encourage us to draw significant morals from the paradox. These 
include morals concerning self-knowledge and de se thought and talk, the norms 
constitutively governing assertion and belief, and so on. In Coliva’s appendix, she offers a 
diagnosis of what’s going on in the paradox, focusing on (in the terminology I’ve introduced 
above) doxastic Moorean beliefs, in both their omissive and commissive versions, though 
Coliva also touches on issues around Moorean assertions. Moreover, she too wants to draw 
a significant moral, namely that ‘any satisfactory account of Moore’s paradox will have to 
unravel the complexity of our concept of belief’ (2016: 255). Accounts that don’t appeal 
centrally to the distinction between beliefs as commitments and beliefs as dispositions will 
‘lose’ the paradox (in a sense I’ll say more about shortly); indeed, we not only need the 
notion of belief as commitment to save the paradox, but ‘we need to stick to a rather 
resolute notion of commitment’ (2016: 244). Let’s unpack what Coliva might mean by this, 
and how she argues for this moral. 
 
Coliva focuses on the following two forms of Moorean conjunction: 
 
(1) I believe that P, but it is not the case that P 
                                                     
1 There’s no commissive version of the epistemic paradox, given the factivity of knowledge. 
 
(2) I do not believe that P, but it is the case that P 
 
These are the commissive and omissive versions of the paradox respectively, with the order 
of the conjuncts swapped from my original presentation above. Since I don’t think the order 
of the conjuncts matters, let’s work with these forms instead of the usual ones.2 Now, 
before evaluating explanations of the absurdity of assertions of things like (1) and (2), and 
the apparent absurdity or self-defeat involved in believing either conjunction, Coliva asks us 
to consider an example that motivates some constraints on what a response to the paradox 
should look like, as well as the ‘diagnostic suggestion’ that points the way to Coliva’s 
preferred response. Here’s the example: 
 
Jane’s Odd Case 
 
Jane is married to Jim. They have been married for several years and have a 
daughter. Jane is often at home, on her own, attending to domestic chores. From 
time to time, she feels lonely and wishes that she had pursued her own career. More 
often than not, however, she feels much rewarded by the fact that her family is so 
serene. Indeed, when she meets up with her friends, who sometimes complain 
about their husbands, she cannot help remarking that her life makes her happy and 
that her husband is adorable and complete trustworthy. 
 
Still, it often happens that, while preparing for the laundry, Jane carefully searches 
Jim’s pockets. While tidying up his studio, she opens and examines all the drawers. 
While dusting the furniture, she lingers on the screen of his laptop, left open on the 
incoming messages. 
 
One day, Ann, a psychoanalyst friend of Jane’s, approaches her and tells her about 
Freud’s theories concerning the unconscious. Little by little, the deep significance of 
a whole series of previously meaningless actions is disclosed to Jane. Ashamedly, she 
realised that all that attention spent over the content of her husband’s pockets was 
a sign of her being insecure about him. All that dusting the screen of his laptop, a 
symptom of her thinking that he might have some intimate correspondence with 
another woman. Still, Jane knew all too well that Jim had always been the most 
truthful of men. The thought popped into her head: “I do believe that Jim is 
unfaithful to me, but he is not”. (2016: 253) 
 
Coliva takes the example to show that judgments of the form ‘I believe P, but not-P’ can be 
‘perfectly legitimate’, and this raises the threat that ‘Moore’s paradox is dissolved’ (2016: 
254, italics in original). Why might the paradox be dissolved? Coliva isn’t explicit, but the 
natural interpretation is that the paradox (at the level of thought) is standardly presented, 
as it was above, as that associated with the absurdity or self-defeat involved in believing 
things of the form of (1) and (2), despite the fact that such conjunctions will often be 
manifestly consistent. If one can believe something that has the form of (1) but without 
absurdity or self-defeat, precisely the possibility that Coliva takes Jane to illustrate, then 
                                                     
2 Not everyone agrees that the order is irrelevant: see e.g. Gilles 2001: 247-8. 
that seems to undermine the central claim underlying the paradox. Attempts to explain why 
doxastic Moorean beliefs are invariably problematic will simply be misguided. 
 
However, Coliva doesn’t think that the paradox is so easily vanished (nor that it would be a 
good thing if it were, given its philosophical significance). Instead, she articulates some 
conditions which spell out when beliefs in things of the form of (1) and (2) will generate the 
paradox. In doing so, Coliva also offers a constraint on possible treatments of the paradox, 
namely that they shouldn’t overgeneralise to cases (including Jane’s odd case) in which her 
conditions aren’t met. Coliva also thinks that the example motivates the ‘diagnostic 
suggestion’ that ‘any satisfactory account of Moore’s paradox will have to unravel the 
complexity of our concept of belief’ (2016: 255). As noted in the introduction, this doesn’t 
just mean that she thinks that such we will need to appeal to the distinction between beliefs 
as dispositions and beliefs as commitments, but that ‘we need to stick to a rather resolute 
notion of commitment’ (2016: 244). 
 
3. Coliva’s Account 
 
To begin, we need to table Coliva’s conditions for when a doxastic Moorean belief—a belief 
in something of the form of (1) or (2)—will be genuinely Moore paradoxical. First, one’s 
first-order belief must be an item of self-knowledge: something that one is conscious of 
(2016: 255). In Jane’s odd case, this constraint is met after, but not before, she becomes 
aware that she believes that her husband is being unfaithful to her. As this brings out, for a 
mental state to be self-known or conscious to one in this sense doesn’t require that one 
acquire that knowledge or consciousness in a distinctively first-personal way; above we saw 
that Coliva recognises a category of ‘third-personal self-knowledge’, and as I understand 
her, this is all that her first condition requires. Additionally, the belief being attributed to 
one in (1) must be a belief as commitment rather than a mere disposition. It’s this condition 
that fails to be met in Jane’s odd case even after she recognises her belief that her husband 
is unfaithful; when she comes to believe something of the form of (1), she is merely 
attributing to herself a belief as disposition, with the relevant disposition being revealed in 
her jealous behaviour. That’s why her belief, despite being Moorean in form, is not Moore 
paradoxical. Coliva’s proposal is that these conditions serve to pick out a subset of beliefs in 
Moorean conjunctions that are genuinely paradoxical, while leaving room for cases such as 
Jane. The paradox may shrink a little, but it doesn’t disappear. 
 
In ‘saving’ the paradox in this way, we’ve already had to invoke the distinction between 
beliefs as dispositions and beliefs as commitments. We haven’t as yet seen any need for the 
‘rather resolute’ notion of commitment that Coliva takes to be necessary to do justice to the 
paradox, but we are in a position to ask the question that will bring it into view: why are 
doxastic Moorean beliefs that meet Coliva’s two conditions inherently irrational or self-
defeating? 
 
Coliva offers two responses to this question, with the second improving on the first, by 
Coliva’s lights, precisely because it invokes a resolute notion of commitment. Since Coliva’s 
second response builds on her first, let’s take them in turn. Despite there being different 
accounts of what having a belief as commitment requires, Coliva takes these accounts to all 
agree that ‘beliefs as commitments are attitudes of acceptance of a given propositional 
content that are intrinsically normative’ (2016: 257). What does ‘intrinsically normative’ 
mean here? There are weaker and stronger answers to this question invoked in Coliva’s 
discussion. It’s the weaker answer that’s relevant to Coliva’s first treatment of Moore’s 
paradox, as far as I can tell; we’ll come back to the stronger answer when we consider her 
‘second pass’ at the paradox below. 
 
Here’s Coliva’s ‘first pass’. According to the weaker answer, beliefs as commitments are 
‘intrinsically’ normative in the sense that having such a belief that P involves seeing that one 
ought to use P as a premise in one’s (practical and theoretical) reasoning. Now, consider (1) 
again: 
 
(1) I believe that P, but it is not the case that P 
 
The idea is that believing this would involve a certain kind of irrationality. Suppose, in line 
with Coliva’s conditions on when a belief of this form is genuinely Moore-paradoxical, that 
the first conjunct picks out a belief as commitment. Then I’m self-ascribing a belief that 
requires me to recognise that I ought to use P as a premise in my reasoning. But in asserting 
that it’s not the case that P, I thereby commit to using the negation of P as a premise in my 
reasoning, and I’d thereby be guilty of irrationality: 
 
Thus [one] would commit [oneself] (knowingly and willingly) to reasoning from 
contradictory premises. And this would be irrational. (2016: 260, italics in original) 
 
Coliva’s first treatment of (2) is similar; I won’t go through the details for considerations of 
space. 
 
However, Coliva isn’t satisfied with this explanation of what’s wrong with doxastic Moorean 
beliefs (in cases where her conditions are met). Here’s her worry. Suppose that one can 
‘knowingly and willingly’ reason from contradictory premises, despite the irrationality of 
doing so. Then in believing (or asserting) something with the form of (1) in such a case, one 
would just be correctly representing on one’s own irrational state of mind: ‘if it were 
possible for a subject to endorse incompatible commitments, what would then prevent one 
from judging and even from asserting that one did?’ (2016: 261). So again, the paradox 
seems to go missing; instead of explaining why believing (1) would itself be irrational, this 
first account leaves open the possibility that believing (1) might be a perfectly correct and 
reasonable representation of an irrational state of mind. 
 
Doing better involves the advertised ‘resolute’ notion of commitment. Coliva’s ‘first pass’ 
ran aground on the possibility that one might knowingly and willingly reason from 
contradictory premises, and so the idea is to close off that possibility: we need to 
understand the notion of commitment in ‘a more demanding way and, in particular, as 
entailing a negative answer to the question whether it is possible knowingly and willingly to 
hold incompatible commitments’ (2016: 261-2). Here Coliva appeals to the stronger 
interpretation of the claim that beliefs as commitments are ‘intrinsically normative’, 
mentioned above. Coliva quotes the following passage from Bilgrami to elaborate: 
 
In this latter normative usage, to desire something, to believe something, is to think 
that one ought to do or think various things, those things that are entailed by those 
desires and beliefs by the light of certain normative principles of inference (those 
codifying deductive rationality, decision-theoretic rationality, perhaps inductive 
rationality and also perhaps some broader forms of material inference having to do 
with the meanings of words as well). (2006: 213)3 
 
On Bilgrami’s view, one doesn’t need to in fact do the things entailed by one’s attitudes, 
given these (often implicitly grasped) normative principles, but one does need to think one 
ought to do them. Coliva is more neutral on whether the latter by itself suffices for one to 
count has having the relevant commitments (2016: 259). What’s important for her purposes 
is instead what she takes to be an implication of this way of developing the idea that beliefs 
as commitments are ‘intrinsically normative’, namely that having a belief as commitment 
involves ‘seeing oneself as having to implement a certain sort of behaviour’, and that ‘there 
is an internal link between the content of one’s belief as commitment and the kinds of 
actions that one ought to perform given that belief’ (2016: 258-9). I find this a bit puzzling. 
We can readily come up with plausible normative consequences of someone’s having a 
belief as commitment that P which are intimately tied to the content of that belief; for 
example, perhaps to have this belief as commitment involves recognition that one ought to 
use P as a premise in one’s theoretical and practical reasoning, or recognition that if 
someone asks one whether one believes that P one ought to, other things being equal, 
answer in the affirmative, and so on. These are recognisably versions of the weaker 
interpretation of the claim that beliefs as commitments are intrinsically normative 
distinguished above, and Coliva sometimes writes as if this is all she has in mind (e.g. 2016: 
259-60).4 But the passage we’ve just quoted, we get the idea that there are specific ‘courses 
of action’ that one must see oneself as committed to undertaking, and which can potentially 
be specified in independent terms, but which are still internally linked to the content P. 
Here’s Coliva’s own example:  
 
For example, if I believe that it is raining and I do not want to get wet, I ought, ceteris 
paribus, to go out with an umbrella, whereas if I merely so wished, I would not. 
(2016: 257) 
 
This helps to illustrate what I said in the previous paragraph. Going out with an umbrella is a 
specific course of action, and it’s one specified in terms distinct to those used to specify the 
content of the belief that it is raining. Of course, there is a relationship between the relevant 
terms here (given that an umbrella just is a particular kind of device with the function of 
protecting its user against rain), and recall from the passage from Bilgrami quoted above 
that the commitments one needs to recognise might include those entailed by one’s 
attitudes in light of ‘some broader forms of material inference having to do with the 
meanings of words as well’. But this semantic link acknowledged, I’m not sure in what sense 
there’s an ‘internal link’ between the content of the belief that it is raining and the course of 
action of taking an umbrella. Notice that in Coliva’s example, it’s specified that one has a 
particular desire, not getting rained on, and there’s a ceteris paribus clause in the mix too; 
                                                     
3 Coliva mistakenly references this passage to Bilgrami 2012. 
4 Thanks to discussion with Daniel Stoljar here. 
this clause will presumably require that it’s the case that there’s no other equally good or 
better way to satisfy my desire to stay dry, given my belief that it’s raining, and it may 
gesture at a number of other conditions too. Given all this, it’s not clear to me in what sense 
there’s an ‘internal link’ here. Taking P as a premise in one’s practical reasoning is plausibly 
a normative commitment that has an internal link to the content of one’s belief that P; I’m 
less clear how there could be an internal link between P and particular courses of action 
that would be the conclusion of such practical reasoning, were one’s desires a certain way 
and all other things equal. 
 
Having registered this point of puzzlement, let me continue to lay out Coliva’s second and 
final treatment of Moore’s paradox. The idea, as I understand it, is to appeal to the internal 
link between the contents of beliefs as commitments and the associated mandated courses 
of action in order to argue that knowingly and willingly holding inconsistent beliefs as 
commitments is impossible. Why would this be impossible? Because ‘the courses of action 
mandated by inconsistent commitments are mutually exclusive’, such that to commit 
oneself to the course of action mandated by the negation of P is to thereby relinquish any 
commitment one had to the course of action mandated by P, and vice versa; one cannot be 
committed to both at the same time (2016: 262). Coliva again appeals to her example to 
illustrate this. Suppose Jane wants to remain dry, and the only way she can do so is to open 
her umbrella. 
 
Now, if she has the belief as a commitment that it is raining, she ought to see herself 
as bound to opening the umbrella. If she has the belief as a commitment that it is 
not raining, she ought to see herself as bound to not opening the umbrella. Finally, if 
she is open minded with respect to whether it is raining, she ought to see herself as 
bound neither to opening the umbrella nor to keeping it close[d]. The three kinds of 
action, which are respectively internally linked to each kind of belief as a 
commitment a subject might have, however, are mutually exclusive.’ (2016: 262) 
 
Since having a belief as commitment involves recognising the course of action it ‘internally 
mandates’, and since the courses of action mandated by inconsistent premises are mutually 
incompatible, it is impossible to bind oneself to the commitments of inconsistent premises. 
But that’s precisely what would be involved in believing something of the form of (1), in 
circumstances where Coliva’s conditions for genuine instances of Moore’s paradox to arise 
are met, and so no such belief is possible (and there’s a similar story to be told about belief 
in conjuncts of the form of (2)). Moreover, asserting things like (1) or (2) ‘would be self-
defeating in the sense of expressing an impossible cognitive situation’ (2016: 254). 
 
I find this treatment of the paradox rather complicated, and as I’ve already mentioned, I’m 
puzzled by the idea that certain beliefs (as commitments) ‘internally mandate’ certain 
courses of action in virtue of their contents. Practical reasoning to conclusions about what 
course of action one ought to taken, given that one has a particular belief, seems like a 
messy business—one which depends on what else one believes, one’s other relevant 
desires and intentions, and whatever other factors need to be covered by the ceteris 
paribus clause that Coliva herself makes use of. Given this, I’m not sure in what sense a 
particular course of action might be ‘internally mandated’ by a particular belief as 
commitment. Further, Coliva’s conclusion, that beliefs in things of the form of (1) and (2) 
which meet her other two conditions are impossible, strikes me as rather too strong; such 
beliefs would be deeply irrational and self-defeating, and this needs explanation, but I find 
the claim that they are impossible surprising. As a corollary of this, I have a worry with 
Coliva’s proposed explanation of the absurdity/contradictory-feel of doxastic Moorean 
assertions. As we saw a moment ago, her idea is that such assertions ‘would be self-
defeating in the sense of expressing an impossible cognitive situation’. That might explain 
why we ought not assert things like (1) and (2). But why do we hear such assertions as 
problematic? The answer ‘because they express an impossible cognitive situation’ only 
seems to hold water to the extent that this is something hearers are, implicitly at least, 
aware of. To the extent that my own reaction—that it would be surprising were doxastic 
Moorean beliefs (meeting Coliva’s conditions) to prove impossible—is not idiosyncratic, this 
explanation of why we hear the assertions as absurd seems dubious, even if Coliva is correct 
that such beliefs would be impossible. 
 
4. Less is Moore 
 
In other work (McGlynn 2013), I’ve favoured a comparatively minimalistic account of 
doxastic versions of Moore’s paradox, defended in various places by John Williams (e.g. 
Williams 1996 and 1998, Green and Williams 2007: 10-11). The key claims of the account 
are that belief distributes over conjunction, and that we’re sensitive to this fact. Suppose 
that I form a belief of the form (2): ‘I do not believe that P, but P’. Since belief distributes 
over the conjunction, it follows that I believe that P, and this is a consequence I recognise. 
But clearly my belief can only be true if I don’t believe that P. So the content of my Moorean 
belief is false, if I believe it; and this is something that only a little reflection will let me 
appreciate. In this sense, any belief of this form would be inherently and obviously self-
defeating. This account can be extended to the commissive version of the paradox, (1), 
though with some differences. Suppose I believe something of the form ‘I believe that P, but 
it is not the case that P’. Since belief distributes, it follows that I believe P. The truth of the 
content of my belief, however, requires that I believe the negation of P. So if I have this 
belief, and it’s true, it follows that I believe P and I believe its negation; this belief would 
require me to be patently inconsistent. And once again, this line of reasoning is transparent 
to me, meaning that such a belief is also rationally self-defeating in a way.5 We can then say 
a number of things about doxastic Moorean assertions. Perhaps the most natural is a 
straightforward analogue of Coliva’s own account of such assertions; such assertions are 
attempts to express inherently and obviously self-defeating states of mind. 
 
This style of explanation of doxastic Moorean beliefs (and assertions) is pleasingly simple 
and economical. It’s not without assumptions and consequences that can be challenged, of 
                                                     
5 Objecting to a different kind of approach to the paradox, Coliva notes that a conjunction of 
the form ‘I believe that P and I believe that not-P’ is ‘not a contradiction or—as such—an 
absurd judgement’ (2016: 251). But on the account I’m recommending, it’s not this 
conjunction that’s absurd, but rather knowingly forming a belief that can only be true if one 
has such patently contradictory beliefs. Moreover, the principle at work in the account in 
the text is a relatively uncontroversial basic tenant of doxastic logic—belief distributes over 
conjunction—while the account criticised by Coliva invokes Gareth Evans’s elusive and 
controversial transparency thesis. 
course. One might dispute the principle of doxastic logic it relies on, or the further claim 
that this is a principle that figures in our thinking about ourselves and others. One might be 
concerned about the asymmetric treatments of the omissive and commissive variants of the 
paradox. One might worry that the explanation cannot be readily extended to beliefs of the 
form P, but I don’t know that P (though personally I think that this is an advantage: see 
McGlynn 2013). But if one accepts this kind of approach to Moore’s paradox, it’s likely one 
will be wary of claims that reflection on the paradox has significant pay-offs when it comes 
to understanding agency, self-knowledge, the nature and norms of belief, and so on. 
 
The question now is whether a style of explanation this thin might be adequate. It does 
seem to do better than some of the other rival explanations criticised by Coliva in her 
appendix. Like her own account, it takes the paradox at the level of thought to be primary, 
rather than treating the paradox as an issue at the level of pragmatics and speech act 
theory, and it doesn’t have the problematic implication that doxastic Moorean conjunctions 
are disguised contradictions. What about Jane’s odd case, though? 
 
Recall that Jane self-attributes a belief that she’d express with ‘I do believe that Jim is 
unfaithful to me, but he is not’, based on inference from both her jealous behavior and her 
knowledge of Jim’s fidelity. A straightforward application of the account just offered of (1) 
seems to yield the result that this belief is inherently and obviously self-defeating, and this 
conflicts with Coliva’s verdict that the belief is ‘perfectly legitimate’. However, I’m not 
totally convinced that Coliva’s verdict here is right. No doubt the long backstory reduces the 
oddness or absurdity of Jane’s belief and assertion somewhat. However, it doesn’t remove it 
entirely, as I think we can draw out by comparing her belief and assertion to a variant in the 
past tense: 
 
‘I do believe that Jim is unfaithful to me, but he is not’ 
 
‘I did believe that Jim is unfaithful to me, but he is not’ 
 
Even with Coliva’s detailed backstory for Jane’s predicament in mind, an assertion of the 
second of these conjunctions seems devoid of the characteristic absurdity of Moorean 
assertions in a way that, to my mind, contrasts with Jane’s actual assertion of the first. 
Likewise, a belief in the claim expressed by the latter seems much less absurd or irrational 
than Jane’s belief in the case as described by Coliva. The backstory lessens the perceived 
absurdity or irrationality of Jane’s belief and assertion (as detailed backstories are quite 
generally apt to do) but the paradox doesn’t ‘disappear’.6 
 
In this final section, I’ve briefly tabled an account of the absurdity of doxastic Moorean 
beliefs (and the corresponding assertions) which doesn’t require Coliva’s ‘resolute’ notion of 
belief as commitment—indeed, it’s an account that, as I’ve developed it, is rather insensitive 
to the distinction between beliefs as dispositions and beliefs as commitments (though I 
don’t mean to deny that such a distinction can or should be drawn). If this account of the 
                                                     
6 If one favoured Coliva’s verdict about the case over mine, would that spell the end of the 
minimalist account of the paradox I’ve sketched in this section? I think not, but I lack the 
space to take this issue on, and so I’ll need to rest content with the stance taken in the text. 
paradox is viable, it stands as a challenge to Coliva’s ‘diagnostic suggestion’ that ‘any 
satisfactory account of Moore’s paradox will have to unravel the complexity of our concept 
of belief’. I predict that Coliva will not be persuaded that it takes Moore’s paradox seriously 
enough; for my own part, I continue to suspect that philosophers are inclined to take the 
paradox a bit too seriously.7 
 
References 
 
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2006. Self-Knowledge and Resentment. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2012. ‘The Unique Status of Self-Knowledge’, in Annalisa Coliva (ed.), The 
Self and Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 265-78. 
Coliva, Annalisa. 2016. The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gendler, Tamar. 2008. ‘Alief and Belief’, Journal of Philosophy 105: 634-63. 
Gilles, Anthony. 2001. ‘A New Solution to Moore’s Paradox’, Philosophical Studies 105: 237-
50. 
Green, Mitchell and John Williams. 2007. ‘Introduction’, in Mitchell Green and John Williams 
(eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: 3-36. 
McGlynn, Aidan. 2013. ‘Believing Things Unknown’, Noûs 47: 385-407. 
Sorensen, Roy. 1988. Blindspots. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Williams, John. 1979. ‘Moore’s Paradox: One or Two?’, Analysis 39: 141-2. 
Williams, John. 1996. ‘Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion’, Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 74: 135-49. 
Williams, John. 1998. ‘Wittgensteinian Accounts of Moorean Absurdity’, Philosophical 
Studies 92: 283-306. 
Wright, Crispin. 2013. ‘A Plurality of Pluralisms’, in Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen and Cory Wright 
(eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 123-153. 
                                                     
7 I am grateful to Lukas Schwengerer and Kegan Shaw for discussion of Coliva’s book, and to 
an audience at a workshop on self-knowledge at the University of Uppsala in April 2018, 
organised by Carl Montan, for feedback on this material. 
